EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORATION, a Wisconsin Corporation,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No. 14-CV-748-SLC

TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES Madison, Wisconsin LIMITED, an Indian Corporation December 8, 2014 and TATA AMERICA INTERNATIONAL 2:00 p.m. CORPORATION, d/b/a TCA America,

Defendants.

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC MOTION HEARING HELD BEFORE MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN L. CROCKER,

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

Jenner & Block BY: NICK SAROS BRENT CASLIN KATE SPELMAN 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600 Los Angeles, California 90071

Quarles & Brady BY: ANTHONY TOMASELLI 33 East Main Street, Ste. 900 Madison, Wisconsin 53703

Also present: Mike Wokasch, in-house counsel

Lynette Swenson RMR, CRR, CBC U.S. District Court Federal Reporter United States District Court 120 North Henry Street, Rm. 520 Madison, Wisconsin 53703 608-255-3821

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

For the Defendants:

Kelley, Drye & Warren LLP BY: DAVID LONG 3050 K St. NW, Ste. 400 Washington, DC 20007

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THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Magistrate Judge Crocker. I understand I have the attorneys for the parties in the Epic Systems Corporation lawsuit against Tata Consultancy Services Limited, Tata America International Corporation. I have a court reporter here, which is why you're on speaker phone. The case number is 14-CV-748-SLC.

Let's find out who is on line and then let's get to the business at hand. Who's appearing on behalf of the plaintiff today, please?

MR. SAROS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's Nick Saros for Epic Systems. Along with me is Brent Caslin and Kate Spelman, and our client's in-house counsel Mike Wokasch is present also. And Tony Tomaselli from Quarles & Brady as well.

THE COURT: All right. Well, good afternoon to all of you. And who have we got on behalf of the defendants today?

MR. LONG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is David Long. I'm an intellectual property attorney with Kelley, Drye & Warren. And it will just be me today for the defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. I think that makes it what? Six against one. But that's probably a fair fight.

All right. Counsel, we're on line to discuss and for the Court to give at least a preliminary, if not a final ruling on the motion for early discovery. That's docketed as 5. It's got some supporting documents, including a brief and the declaration, and Exhibits 6 and 7. The opposition is 19, followed by some exhibits as well.

I've read everything you've sent in to the Court, and as is my practice and as some of you have experienced in other hearings in other cases, what I'm going to do is start by giving you the Court's overview of where I think we find ourselves and where we might be headed and then invite input from each side in turn, starting with the movant.

I'm using conditional verbs and adverbs intentionally because this is one where I don't have a real clear sense yet as to where this all will be headed, but I do have some notions as to where I think it ought to be headed, subject to input from each side.

Let's start with this notion: As I think you understand, but as is sometimes obscured by the way you argued in your briefs, right now the only issue is whether to allow this expedited discovery. It's really not within the Court's purview at this point to decide the merits of any injunctive motion because one has not been filed. Perhaps one will never be filed. I think that's Epic's point, that it wants to explore further whether there's even a basis for it.

Certainly the defendants' view is that this is just a wild goose chase based on wild allegations by a disgruntled -- I think you called him a professional whistleblower, Mr. Guinnet, if I'm pronouncing it correctly. But the Court's view is it may be necessary to get some early discovery so that we can line this up for either a injunctive motion or not.

Now I understand there's some dispute over whether Notaro applies or not and what standard the Court should employ. I would tend to gravitate toward the lower standard, the good cause standard, but I also want to be pragmatic and fair about this. So I'm going to offer some more comments, but so as not to keep anyone in suspense while I monolog, to use the term from the Incredibles, where I think we're headed here is that I'm going to order an early 26(f) conference, as is the

Court's prerogative under 26(f)(1), and get you guys talking about this early discovery. And perhaps it will go in both directions. I think that's part of the discussion you need to have, and that's certainly something the defendants have asked for here, and narrow it a bit. And then from the Court's perspective, there's no good reason not to allow some front-end discovery along the lines requested and allow it perhaps even sooner than an answer comes in.

And I'll just offer this as one of the reasons for proceeding in this fashion, then I'll offer some more general comments in response to the briefs that were submitted by both sides. As the record reflects and as counsel all know, the case was filed on October 31. The motion to expedite came in on November 7. The computer here in the court set a seven-day response cycle. We realized pretty quickly that there was no one who had appeared yet on behalf of the defendants even to respond. So we put sort of a conditional deadline on that.

Well, service was proved as of November 6. That would have required a response or answer within about 20 days. But then the parties stipulated on November 25 to extend the answer/response deadline out to December 29, which I think is very practical and very fair,

particularly given the holidays. Although December 29 isn't a very nice date either. But the point is you've already got about a month-long extension past where the 26(f) conference would normally fall. So from the Court's perspective, there's no reason from a discovery point of view not to get that 26(f) going now, get the parties talking more specifically about the sorts of discovery that might be needed here to frame the injunctive issue that concerns Epic Systems, and then get a little bit more meat on the bones of the motion. So let's segue from there.

I also tend to agree with the defendants that the Court will need a little bit more proof of these contentions before it actually orders the sorts of discovery that's been required here. I surmise that it's available. For instance, there was talk in the brief of a Kaiser investigator talking to Mr. Gajaram, if I'm pronouncing that correctly, and I don't remember the exact verbs used, but the proffer in the brief was that Mr. Gajaram admitted to the Kaiser investigator that he had misappropriated the 6,000 files and that he had shared them with the other two employees,

Mr. Anandham and Mr. Gunasekaram, inferentially without the permission of Epic and outside of his scope as a consultant for Kaiser. Well, I'd like to see that

report. Under seal or whatever. And I think if defendants' attorney hasn't seen that yet, he and his colleagues are entitled to see that report also.

To the extent that there is some concern about what's in the 6,000 files and why that might lead to an incorporation, an unfair incorporation into the Medic Mantra software, it would not hurt and the Court may direct that Epic follow up along those lines as well.

Just connect the dots here a little bit more.

Now along those same lines, the defendants in their brief suggest that you can't get an injunction for future harm that isn't imminent. I'm not so sure that it's not a good basis to get discovery now that there has not been time yet for the defendants to incorporate any misappropriated files into their software. And again, we're just speaking for the purpose of discovery. I want to make clear to both sides right now that the Court is not taking sides here. I have no idea what really happened. That will all be proved up at the appropriate time in the appropriate manner, whether that's through an injunctive proceeding or simply the lawsuit itself. But right now the Court doesn't have the information that would allow it to decide who's right and who's wrong. And I'm not picking sides here.

But if we were to assume for the purposes of

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discovery that there were misappropriated files, then
the fact that they have not yet been incorporated into
software to the Court is not a very persuasive reason
not to allow the discovery and perhaps not to allow an
injunction. But that's putting the cart ahead of the
horse. The question now is what kind of discovery do we
need and how robust should it be and how quickly should
it occur. Okay?

So I'm thinking a lot of the discovery that's requested here is probably appropriate. Frankly if the three consultants who are in good standing with their employer, with the defendants, were simply to explanation what they were doing with their Kaiser IDs and why, perhaps they could put the lie to Mr. Guinnet's allegations very quickly and Epic would back off. certainly would be the outcome if the defendants' proffer is an accurate one. So I'm not sure why some sort of an audio/visual deposition or a Skype deposition across the ocean would not be beneficial to both sides here, setting aside all of the consular notification and other diplomatic niceties that would attend flies attorneys over to -- I'm not sure if it's Mumbai or New Dehli that Mr. Gajaram is, but somewhere in India. again, that would be part of the 26(f) conference.

Nobody really picked up on the Request No. 4, the

Rule 45 document subpoena to Kaiser. Maybe that's the 800-pound gorilla sitting on the couch that nobody wants to disturb. I understand that. But if that's part of the mix, then I'm wondering who has — who has talked to Kaiser; who's asked them whether this is something that's easy or hard to do; how they feel about this; do they need to lawyer up here. I think that needs to be part of the discussion as well. Because if the Court is going to require early discovery and that involves getting documents from Kaiser directly, well, they've got a dog in this fight and they ought to be able to say what they think as well.

As for the scope of the document requests, I think both sides have some good points there. I think maybe some of these documents that the defendants have would be very useful to the question or to answering the question whether there's some need for injunctive relief here. I don't know that it all needs to be done. I think maybe Epic aimed broadly on purpose so that it didn't miss something, but that's also something I think could be sifted and winnowed down at a 26(f) conference.

I'm going to offer this in terms of the Court's vision of timing here and then I'm going to stop talking and turn the floor over to the plaintiff, the movant.

The Court generally tries not to jam up attorneys with

their families over the holidays. I'm not sure that we can avoid that completely here. But the Court's view is that if we have a 26(f) conference before the major winter holidays, if you guys can meet-and-confer before, say, the 19th, which is the Friday of the week before Christmas or maybe even the 22nd or 23rd and get a report to the Court, perhaps with a section or a couple of sections about the expedited discovery, framing the agreements in light of my direction and the disagreements that might require the Court to referee them, then we could maybe get this discovery taken in January. But I'll tell you right now it's not going to happen any earlier than late January. It might even be February, at which point given the timing of the answer here or the other response, we're going to be in regular discovery anyway.

Now I acknowledge that we don't normally depose percipient witnesses right out of the gate, so that would be abnormal, but it would not be contrary to the rules. So it wouldn't be something where Notaro or the good cause standard would apply, it would just be a matter of fairness and pragmatism. And of course along those lines, to the extent the defendants want to suggest immediate discovery that is genuinely necessary for the Court to determine what ought to happen next in

terms of injunctive relief, that's part of the mix as well. All right? A pretty long opening statement, but I hope you find it helpful.

With that, let's turn the floor over to whoever is the point person for the plaintiff today.

MR. SAROS: Thank you, Your Honor. This is

Nick Saros for Epic. There are a lot of points, some of
which I have no comment to, so I'm only going to raise
the points where I have a comment. The first one is
regarding the Kaiser Permanente relationship. There was
a declaration provided from a Mr. MacLeod, and just for
the Court's clarification, he is the Kaiser investigator
and he interviewed Mr. Gajaram and it was his
declaration that described what he determined in that
interview where Mr. Gajaram initially denied downloading
or saving any documents and then -- and denied providing
his log-in credentials to other people. And then --

THE COURT: Right. That's Docket 9. I've got that. But is there a more robust report or is that it?

MR. SAROS: I think that's all we got from Kaiser.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will guess I'm used to investigative reports by special agents. This is pretty vague, from the Court's perspective. But that said, if you did beef that up, that's what I'm looking

for.

MR. SAROS: We have -- you know, so there has been -- to answer your question, one of your later questions about Kaiser and the subpoena to them, which we did ask for, there has been communications with Kaiser's lawyers. They have been involved. They are, as you said, lawyered up. So they've been involved in this and they understand the problem. And it was the Kaiser lawyers that got the Kaiser investigator involved.

THE COURT: Well, I would have surmised that. What's their response to your request to the Court for an early subpoena? Do they care?

MR. SAROS: I think they want us to negotiate a subpoena with them. I mean our initial hope was that Kaiser would just give us every bit of their investigation and that hasn't proven to be the case.

And --

THE COURT: Did they say why not?

MR. SAROS: I don't -- no.

THE COURT: Okay. I keep interrupting you.

What else have you got?

MR. SAROS: Okay. No, that's okay, Your Honor.

I obviously don't mind that. You mentioned another

proof of the contentions, you mentioned what's in the

6,000 files. We have a list of the documents, the dates of the download, and the IP addresses where they show the downloads were from. We would of course be happy to provide that.

no use for just a list of what the documents are. That would be meaningless to the Court. It's more along the analogy I offered of connecting the dots. What is it about these 6,000 files that arguably would have caused Mr. Gajaram to download them illicitly and covertly for the benefit of his employer? What use could the defendants make of these documents that they would have gone to such lengths to obtain them improperly? That's the sort of proffer I need.

MR. SAROS: Well, I think part of that, Your Honor, is in the declaration of Stirling Martin, who is one of the primary technical employees at Epic and he describes the types of documents. It's what we tried to have him detail, give at least some evidence, and he describes them as highly sensitive documents to Epic that would allow someone to reverse engineer the functionality of Epic software.

THE COURT: Sure. This is Docket -- just so we're clear, this is Docket 8 in the file, and I've got that and I've read that. And again, this is a very good

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headline version. What I would suggest -- and again, I want to be clear. We're not going to make you prove that you are entitled to injunctive relief before you even do the discovery. I think there's sort of that bootstrapping problem that Notaro creates. something a little bit more robust. Again, I'm looking at paragraph nine where he's talking about 6,477 documents accounting for 1,687 unique files. You know, a couple of examples of that. You know, paragraph 11, "The functionality would allow a competitor to reverse engineer the functionality of Epic." And he goes on to explain why he says that. If you could provide a little bit more, just a couple of examples of that, not just for the Court's benefit, but also for Mr. Long's benefit and for his technical people so that if they dispute that, they've got a basis for that. So they know what Mr. Martin is actually referring to as opposed to a headline version. Again, not everything, but just a couple of concrete examples. Does that make sense? MR. SAROS: Yeah, I think that does, Your I understand what you're saying and we'd be fine Honor. with that.

THE COURT: Okay. Back to you.

MR. SAROS: The one question I have, you talked a little bit about setting an early 26(f) conference and

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one of -- my only concern with that, I think that's a good idea. My only concern with that is that starts the regular discovery process. The depositions that we're seeking of the three consultants, we think that they should be initial expedited for the purpose of determining what happened. You know, we believe there's been a wrongdoing, the evidence shows a wrongdoing, and there's really no rebuttal of that.

THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Saros, let me interrupt you again because maybe I can allay that concern for both you and Mr. Long. By having an early 26(f) conference, I want that because of your motion, and I understand that that is the trigger for everything else that follows. But to the extent that the parties would not have agreed to this on their own, I would direct both sides sequence this so that you focus, like I said, in a section or a couple of sections on this preliminary discovery that you're requesting and that perhaps defendants will counter request, but then set forth your notions, perhaps by agreement of the parties, perhaps on two parallel tracks, of what ought to happen next with the regular case. In other words, maybe you stay discovery until this issue is resolved, at least in terms of discovery and a motion filed or not. Then the regular discovery begins. Then you disclose regular

experts, and so forth, leading to a trial date at this point in early 2016.

Now maybe you'll stick with me as the judge. You being both sides. Nobody has asked you to consent or decline yet. Maybe you'll get a different judge. But I'm the calendaring judge for every civil lawsuit in this court and I can tell you all that no judge here has a trial date available before February of 2016. It just isn't going to happen any sooner than that. And it can be later if we need it.

So in other words, Mr. Saros, you all meet. You have your 26(f). Topic Number 1 is what we are we going to do about this early discovery. And then Topics 2 through 8 or 2 through 12 are what about the rest of the case? What do you think we ought to do then? I hope that's helpful. But back to you.

MR. SAROS: Yes, that is helpful. But my only point was just because -- if we do go through that process, just because we have a short targeted deposition of those three, doesn't mean we're precluded later, which I think was in the opposition brief.

THE COURT: Well, that's something that we will decide once the parties have had a chance to meet-and-confer. I'm not real keen on denying anyone a second shot at these witnesses. If we're going to

expedite it, I don't think either side will have a full knowledge of what they might want to ask them this early. So from the Court's perspective, as justice and fairness requires, we can always redepose any witness in any lawsuit. If we need an advance ruling on that, you'll get one. But we're not going to get that ruling today. But certainly the Court is not averse to allowing that in this case. It has not been averse to allowing it in other cases either. That's our track record. Back to you.

MR. SAROS: Okay. I think that's it, Your Honor. We just want to find out what happens to Epic stuff and I think what you said, the procedure you're outlining we would agree with.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you for your input. Mr. Long, to you then for any input you'd like to offer, either on my comments or on those that Mr. Saros offered.

MR. LONG: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. And generally I agree with what you've set out as well. And we state in our brief what we believe has happened here and what more things we need to find out to make clear, just because clients seem to get drug through the mud a bit by their motion. It's actually a very good corporate citizen, good client, respects intellectual

property rights, an innovator itself. We don't think there's any impropriety here and that will bear out as we go forward.

I had a couple of questions on the timing of things, and maybe that ends up being things that the parties can work out in the Rule 26(f) conference, and if we can't, we know where you're at. One is that this timing of the Rule 26(f) conference itself would be right when we're in the middle of filing what will end up being a motion to dismiss, I'm fairly certain, on the Complaint itself. I would prefer, just given the holidays and such, if we'd push that off to at least the 29th, the day our brief was — our response to the Complaint would be due.

THE COURT: I would prefer not to. It sounds like what you really are concerned about, Mr. Long, although you're much too diplomatic to say so, is you've got your team working on your dismissal motion and that's taking all their time. I get it, but Kelley, Drye & Warren is a big firm. I don't know how big the team is here, but you've got a big client. I'm not inclined to wait until after the holidays. So if you're asking for a direct answer, the answer is no.

MR. LONG: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

Probably the next question I have, I think it will go

toward what the parties will discuss in the Rule 26(f) conference, but that's that — a couple things. We have not seen the Kaiser report. We asked for it but hadn't received it. We have not seen any information that plaintiff Epic has gathered as far as finding which documents they believe were downloaded by a TCF employee, when, where, what the document was. So I think when we look at that Rule 26(f) conference at least anyhow, some of the focus will need to be getting down to that information. And when —

THE COURT: I agree. And let me interrupt. A
I tried to make clear to Mr. Saros, and let me confirm
to you, you're entitled to this now. Your view is that
we're doing something extraordinary here, and you're
right. And before we embark on this extraordinary
adventure, both the Court and your client and your law
firm are entitled to a little bit more detail. So
certainly that's something you can discuss at the 26(f)
conference. Maybe you guys can work it out before you
even meet about certain things that they can send over
to you as PDFs or email, but I agree with you on that.
So back to you.

MR. LONG: Thank you, Your Honor. I believe in looking through this, given that we wouldn't have the opportunity to do mutual discovery, which I think

creates some of that practical balance we talked about in our briefing papers, I don't think I really have any more at the moment unless Your Honor has any questions for me.

THE COURT: No, not at this point. And let me just offer some direction, then Mr. Saros, it's your motion, so I'll entertain a brief reply, although the operative word here would be brief. I really don't want to micromanage this so that if the Epic team would just as soon meet closer to the 29th or after, you may. But the Court's view is I want this to happen before Christmas. I want you guys to have this meeting sooner rather than later because I want to start that ball rolling down the hill. Okay?

That said, I'm going to leave it to the parties in the first instance to sort out what needs to happen; how much needs to happen. You guys are much better than that than the Court is, so I'm going to try to stay out of your way. But as Mr. Long pointed, you know where to find me and I don't want you to be shy. If you need to call me during the conference, it's just like calling during a depo. I would be happy to call the balls and strikes over the phone if I can see them. So that's available to you.

Other than that, I'll leave it to you all to figure

out the nuances, the details and so forth as best you can in terms of timing as well. All right? At this juncture, I will stay the final decision on the motion — I guess it's more accurate to say I'm granting it in part and denying it in part in the manner and for the reasons stated. I'll enter just a very brief text-only order that refers back to this conference. I'll indicate that I've ordered an early 26(f) conference pursuant to what the Rule allows and then just wait to hear back from the parties.

I think that covers it at this point. But

Mr. Long, I guess I'll check in with you. Any questions

about the Court's last set of statements here before I

check in one last time with Mr. Saros?

MR. LONG: No, Your Honor. I think we'll have access to the transcript. It all seemed clear to me at this point.

THE COURT: Absolutely. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Saros, then it's your motion. Any brief reply? Any
addition questions in light of what Mr. Long said or
what the Court has now said?

MR. SAROS: Yes. One additional question we haven't talked about is Mr. Guinnet's documents and that's a point where it's kind of an odd situation which we'd like to -- he said he has documents showing certain

things that we detailed in our brief and I don't believe TCF has access to those either.

THE COURT: Well, I think defendants raise a valid point. He's still employed by them and so they own the documents right now. He may be a whistleblower, but you're not the FBI. He can't just give them to you. So I think that needs to be part of the 26(f) conference. If that's going to be AEO disclosures, attorney's eyes only, fine. I think you're entitled to see the documents or at least some of them under some level of confidentiality. And the Court is prepared to enter at least a placeholding confidentiality order if the parties need that if you can't work out an agreement. But I don't think he can just give them to you. I don't think that would be appropriate under the circumstances. Does that help?

MR. SAROS: I understand the point. The reason I say it's unusual is because TCS has said in their brief that there don't have access to the documents despite the fact that he's their employee.

THE COURT: So I guess -- well, somebody's got them. I hope he's not just wandering around in a rented car in the desert waiting for somebody to offer him money. But you guys sort that out. He technically -- Tata has control over those documents. Practically I

don't know if that's true or not, but I think that's up to both sides to try to figure out in consultation with Mr. Guinnet.

MR. SAROS: I mean I don't know that he'll talk to anybody. That's the problem. That's why we suggested the subpoena route, to force him to show us what he has. I think whatever documents he has I assume are sitting in his house somewhere.

THE COURT: Well again, I don't want to beat this to death over the phone today because none of us knows exactly what's going to happen, but understanding that at least from the defendants' proffer he doesn't like them anymore, he's still employed by them, he still answers to them, I think in the first instance it's up to them to say Mr. Guinnet, answer your phone. Tell us where the documents are. Make them available to our attorneys so that we can take this to the next step, at which you will either be vindicated or vilified. If he doesn't respond to that and you need a subpoena, fine. If we have to take it to the next step and bring in the FBI, that's not the Court's decision to make either. Let's not look for trouble. How does that sound?

MR. SAROS: I agree with that.

THE COURT: Okay. We're still on your dime.

Anything else today?

MR. SAROS: No. Nothing else.

THE COURT: All right. Then we're done. Thank you all and please enjoy the rest of your afternoon.

MR. LONG: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings concluded at 2:32 p.m.)

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I, LYNETTE SWENSON, Certified Realtime and
Merit Reporter in and for the State of Wisconsin,
certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate record
of the proceedings held on the 8th day of December 2014
before the Honorable Stephen L. Crocker, Magistrate
Judge for the Western District of Wisconsin, in my
presence and reduced to writing in accordance with my
stenographic notes made at said time and place.
Dated this 9th day of December 2014.

/s/

Lynette Swenson, RMR, CRR Federal Court Reporter

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